..
      Copyright 2018 SUSE Linux GmbH
      All Rights Reserved.

      Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); you may
      not use this file except in compliance with the License. You may obtain
      a copy of the License at

          http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0

      Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
      distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, WITHOUT
      WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. See the
      License for the specific language governing permissions and limitations
      under the License.

.. _federation_introduction:

Introduction to Keystone Federation
===================================

----------------------------
What is keystone federation?
----------------------------

Identity federation is the ability to share identity information across multiple
identity management systems. In keystone, this is implemented as an
authentication method that allows users to authenticate directly with another
identity source and then provides keystone with a set of user attributes. This
is useful if your organization already has a primary identity source since it
means users don't need a separate set of credentials for the cloud. It is also
useful for connecting multiple clouds together, as we can use a keystone in
another cloud as an identity source. Using :ref:`LDAP as an identity
backend <integrate_with_ldap>` is
another way for keystone to obtain identity information from an external source,
but it requires keystone to handle passwords directly rather than offloading
authentication to the external source.

Keystone supports two configuration models for federated identity. The most
common configuration is with :ref:`keystone as a Service Provider (SP)
<keystone-as-sp>`, using an
external Identity Provider, such as a Keycloak or Google, as the identity source
and authentication method. The second type of configuration is
":ref:`Keystone to Keystone <keystone_as_idp>`", where two keystones
are linked with one acting as the identity source.

This document discusses identity federation involving a secondary identity
management that acts as the source of truth concerning the users it contains,
specifically covering the SAML2.0 and OpenID Connect protocols, although
keystone can work with other protocols. A similar concept is :doc:`external
authentication </admin/external-authentication>` whereby keystone is
still the source of truth about its users
but authentication is handled externally. Yet another closely related topic is
:doc:`tokenless authentication </admin/configure_tokenless_x509>`
which uses some of the same constructs as described
here but allows services to validate users without using keystone tokens.


--------
Glossary
--------

**Service Provider (SP)**
  A Service Provider is the service providing the resource an end-user is
  requesting. In our case, this is keystone, which provides keystone tokens that
  we use on other OpenStack services. We do NOT call the other OpenStack
  services "service providers". The specific service we care about in this
  context is the token service, so that is our Service Provider.

**Identity Provider (IdP)**
  An Identity Provider is the service that accepts credentials, validates
  them, and generates a yay/nay response. It returns this response along with
  some other attributes about the user, such as their username, their display
  name, and whatever other details it stores and you've configured your Service
  Provider to accept.

**Entity ID or Remote ID**
  An Entity ID or a Remote ID are both names for a unique identifier string for
  either a Service Provider or an Identity Provider. It usually takes the form
  of a URN, but the URN does not need to be a resolvable URL. Remote IDs are
  globally unique. Two Identity Providers cannot be associated with the same
  remote ID. Keystone uses the remote ID retrieved from the HTTPD environment
  variables to match the incoming request with a trusted Identity Provider and
  render the appropriate authorization mapping.

**SAML2.0**
  `SAML2.0`_ is an XML-based federation protocol. It is commonly used in
  internal-facing organizations, such as a university or business in which IT
  services are provided to members of the organization.

**OpenID Connect (OpenIDC)**
  `OpenID Connect`_ is a JSON-based federation protocol built on OAuth 2.0. It's
  used more often by public-facing services like Google.

**Assertion**
  An assertion is a formatted statement from the Identity Provider that asserts
  that a user is authenticated and provides some attributes about the user. The
  Identity Provider always signs the assertion and typically encrypts it as
  well.

**Single Sign-On (SSO)**
  `Single Sign-On`_ is a mechanism related to identity federation whereby a user
  may log in to their identity management system and be granted a token or
  ticket that allows them access to multiple Service Providers.

.. _SAML2.0: http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/Post2.0/sstc-saml-tech-overview-2.0.html
.. _OpenID Connect: https://openid.net/connect/
.. _Single Sign-On: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Single_sign-on

--------------------
Authentication Flows
--------------------

Understanding the flow of information as a user moves through the authentication
process is key to being able to debug later on.

Normal keystone
---------------

.. seqdiag::
   :name: normal-keystone
   :alt: Diagram of keystone's normal auth flow, in which a user agent
         authenticates and authorizes themself with keystone and obtains a
         scoped token to pass to an OpenStack service.

   seqdiag {
     default_fontsize = 13;
     useragent [label = "User Agent"]; keystone [label = "Keystone"]; openstack [label = "OpenStack"];
     useragent -> keystone [label = "GET /v3/auth/tokens"];
     keystone -> keystone [label = "Authenticate"];
     keystone -> keystone [label = "Authorize"];
     useragent <- keystone [label = "Scoped token"];
     useragent -> openstack [label = "GET /v2.1/servers"];
   }

In a normal keystone flow, the user requests a scoped token directly from
keystone. Keystone accepts their credentials and checks them against its local
storage or against its LDAP backend. Then it checks the scope that the user is
requesting, ensuring they have the correct role assignments, and produces a
scoped token. The user can use the scoped token to do something else in
OpenStack, like request servers, but everything that happens after the token is
produced is irrelevant to this discussion.

SAML2.0
-------

SAML2.0 WebSSO
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

.. seqdiag::
   :name: saml2-websso
   :alt: Diagram of a standard WebSSO authentication flow.

   seqdiag {
     edge_length = 325;
     default_fontsize = 13;
     useragent [label = "User Agent"]; sp [label = "Service Provider"]; idp [label = "Identity Provider"];
     useragent -> sp [label = "GET /secure"];
     useragent <- sp [label = "HTTP 302
                               Location: https://idp/auth?
                                         SAMLRequest=req"];
     useragent -> idp [label = "GET /auth?SAMLRequest=req"];
     idp -> idp [label = "Authenticate"];
     useragent <- idp [label = "HTTP 200
                                SAMLResponse in HTML form"];
     useragent -> sp [label = "POST /assertionconsumerservice"];
     sp -> sp [label = "Validate"];
     useragent <- sp [label = "HTTP 302; Location: /secure"];
     useragent -> sp [label = "GET /secure"];
   }

This diagram shows a standard `WebSSO`_ authentication flow, not one involving
keystone. WebSSO is one of a few `SAML2.0 profiles`_. It is based on the idea that a
web browser will be acting as an intermediary and so the flow involves concepts
that a browser can understand and act on, like HTTP redirects and HTML forms.

First, the user uses their web browser to request some secure resource from the
Service Provider. The Service Provider detects that the user isn't authenticated
yet, so it generates a SAML Request which it base64 encodes, and then issues an
HTTP redirect to the Identity Provider.

The browser follows the redirect and presents the SAML Request to the Identity
Provider. The user is prompted to authenticate, probably by filling out a
username and password in a login page. The Identity Provider responds with an
HTTP success and generates a SAML Response with an HTML form.

The browser automatically POSTs the form back to the Service Provider, which
validates the SAML Response. The Service Provider finally issues another
redirect back to the original resource the user had requested.

.. _WebSSO: http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/Post2.0/sstc-saml-tech-overview-2.0-cd-02.html#5.1.Web%20Browser%20SSO%20Profile|outline
.. _SAML2.0 profiles: http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/Post2.0/sstc-saml-tech-overview-2.0-cd-02.html#5.Major%20Profiles%20and%20Federation%20Use%20Cases|outline

SAML2.0 ECP
~~~~~~~~~~~

.. seqdiag::
   :name: saml2-ecp
   :alt: Diagram of a standard ECP authentication flow.

   seqdiag {
     default_fontsize = 13;
     useragent [label = "User Agent"]; sp [label = "Service Provider"]; idp [label = "Identity Provider"];
     useragent -> sp [label = "GET /secure"];
     useragent <- sp [label = "HTTP 200
                               SAML Request"];
     useragent -> idp [label = "POST /auth
                                SAML Request"];
     idp -> idp [label = "Authenticate"];
     useragent <- idp [label = "HTTP 200
                                SAMLResponse in SOAP"];
     useragent -> sp [label = "POST /responseconsumer"];
     sp -> sp [label = "Validate"];
     useragent <- sp [label = "HTTP 200 /secure"];
   }

`ECP`_ is another SAML profile. Generally the flow is similar to the WebSSO
flow, but it is designed for a client that natively understands SAML, for
example the `keystoneauth`_ library (and therefore also the
`python-openstackclient
<https://docs.openstack.org/python-openstackclient/latest/>`__ CLI tool). ECP is
slightly different from the browser-based flow and is not supported by all
SAML2.0 IdPs, and so getting WebSSO working does not necessarily mean ECP is
working correctly, or vice versa. ECP support must often be turned on explicitly
in the Identity Provider.

.. _ECP: http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/Post2.0/sstc-saml-tech-overview-2.0-cd-02.html#5.2.ECP%20Profile|outline
.. _keystoneauth: https://docs.openstack.org/keystoneauth/latest/

WebSSO with keystone and horizon
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~


.. seqdiag::
   :name: saml2-keystone-horizon
   :alt: Diagram of the SAML2.0 WebSSO auth flow specific to horizon, keystone, and the
         HTTPD module acting as service provider.

   seqdiag {
     default_fontsize = 13;
     useragent [label = "User Agent"]; horizon [label = "Horizon"]; httpd [label = "HTTPD", color = "lightgrey"]; keystone [label = "Keystone", color = "lightgrey"]; idp [label = "Identity Provider"];
     useragent -> horizon [label = "POST /auth/login"];
     useragent <- horizon [label = "HTTP 302
                                    Location:
                                    /v3/auth/OS-FEDERATION
                                    /websso/saml2"];
     useragent -> httpd [label = "GET /v3/auth/OS-FEDERATION/websso/saml2"];
     useragent <- httpd [label = "HTTP 302
                                   Location: https://idp/auth?SAMLRequest=req"];
     useragent -> idp [label = "GET /auth"];
     idp -> idp [label = "Authenticate"];
     useragent <- idp [label = "HTTP 200
                                SAMLResponse in HTML form"];
     useragent -> httpd [label = "POST /assertionconsumerservice"];
     httpd -> httpd [label = "Validate"];
     useragent <- httpd [label = "HTTP 302
                                   Location: /v3/auth/OS-FEDERATION/websso/saml2"];
     useragent -> keystone [label = "GET /v3/auth/OS-FEDERATION/websso/saml2"];
     keystone -> keystone [label = "Issue token"];
     useragent <- keystone [label = "HTTP 200
                                     HTML form containing unscoped token"];
     useragent -> horizon [label = "POST /auth/websso"];
     useragent <- horizon [label = "successful login"];
   }

Keystone is not a web front-end, which means horizon needs to handle some parts
of being a Service Provider to implement WebSSO.

In the diagram above, horizon is added, and keystone and HTTPD are split out
from each other to distinguish which parts each are responsible for, though
typically both together are referred to as the Service Provider.

In this model, the user requests to log in to horizon by selecting a federated
authentication method from a dropdown menu. Horizon automatically generates a
keystone URL based on the Identity Provider and protocol selected and redirects
the browser to keystone. That location is equivalent to the /secure resource in
the `SAML2.0 WebSSO`_ diagram. The browser follows the redirect, and the HTTPD
module detects that the user isn't logged in yet and issues another redirect to
the Identity Provider with a SAML Request. At this point, the flow is the same
as in the normal WebSSO model. The user logs into the Identity Provider, a SAML
Response is POSTed back to the Service Provider, where the HTTPD module
validates the response and issues a redirect back to the location that horizon
had originally requested, which is a special federation auth endpoint. At this
point keystone is able to grant an unscoped token, which it hands off as another
HTML form. The browser will POST that back to horizon, which triggers the normal
login process, picking a project to scope to and getting a scoped token from
keystone.

Note that horizon is acting as a middleman, since it knows the endpoint of the
secure resource it requests from keystone.

Keystone to Keystone
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

.. seqdiag::
   :name: keystone-to-keystone
   :alt: Diagram of the IdP-initiated auth flow in a keystone-to-keystone model.

   seqdiag {
     edge_length = 240;
     default_fontsize = 13;
     useragent [label = "User Agent"]; sp [label = "Service Provider"]; idp [label = "Identity Provider"];
     useragent -> idp [label = "POST /v3/auth/tokens"];
     idp -> idp [label = "Authenticate"];
     useragent <- idp [label = "HTTP 201
                                X-Subject-Token: token"];
     useragent -> idp [label = "POST /v3/auth/OS-FEDERATION/saml2/ecp"];
     useragent <- idp [label = "HTTP 201
                                SAMLResponse in SOAP envelope"];
     useragent -> sp [label = "POST /PAOS-url"];
     sp -> sp [label = "Validate"];
     useragent <- sp [label = "HTTP 302"];
     useragent -> sp [label = "GET /v3/OS-FED/.../auth"];
     useragent <- sp [label = "HTTP 201
                               X-Subject-Token: unscoped token"];
     useragent -> sp [label = "POST /v3/auth/tokens
                               (request scoped token)"];
   }

When keystone is used as an Identity Provider in a Keystone to Keystone
configuration, the auth flow is nonstandard. It is similar to an `IdP-initiated
auth flow`_. In this case, the user goes directly to the Identity Provider first
before requesting any resource from the Service Provider. The user will get a
token from keystone, then use that to request a SAML Response via ECP. When it
gets that response back, it POSTs that to the Service Provider, which will grant
a token for it.

Notice that the Service Provider has to accept data from the Identity Provider
and therefore needs to have a way of trusting it. The Identity Provider, on the
other hand, never has to accept data from the Service Provider. There is no back
and forth, the user simply completes the auth process on one side and presents
the result to the other side.

.. _IdP-initiated auth flow: http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/Post2.0/sstc-saml-tech-overview-2.0-cd-02.html#5.1.4.IdP-Initiated%20SSO:%20%20POST%20Binding|outline

OpenID Connect
--------------

OpenID Connect Authentication Flow
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

.. seqdiag::
   :name: openidc
   :alt: Diagram of a standard OpenID Connect authentication flow
   :align: left

   seqdiag {
     edge_length = 330;
     default_fontsize = 13;
     useragent [label = "User Agent"]; sp [label = "Service Provider"]; idp [label = "Identity Provider"];
     useragent -> sp [label = "GET /secure"];
     useragent <- sp [label = "HTTP 302
                               Location: https://idp/auth?
                               client_id=XXX&redirect_uri=https://sp/secure"];
     useragent -> idp [label = "GET /auth?client_id=XXX&redirect_uri=https://sp/secure"];
     idp -> idp [label = "Authenticate"];
     useragent <- idp [label = "HTTP 302
                                Location: https://sp/auth?code=XXX"];
     useragent -> sp [label = "GET /auth?code=XXX"];
     sp -> idp [label = "POST https://idp/token
                         code=XXX&redirect_uri=https://sp/secure"];
     sp <- idp [label = "HTTP 200
                         {\"access_code\": \"XXX\",
                          \"id_token\": \"XXX\"}"];
     useragent <- sp [label = "HTTP 302; Location: /secure"];
     useragent -> sp [label = "GET /secure"];
   }

OpenID Connect is different from any SAML2.0 flow because the negotiation is not
handled entirely through the client. The Service Provider must make a request
directly to the Identity Provider, which means this flow would not be
appropriate if the Service Provider and Identity Provider are in segregated
networks.

When the user requests a secure resource from the Service Provider, they are
redirected to the Identity Provider to log in. The Identity Provider then
redirects the user back to the Service Provider using a known redirect URI and
providing an authorization code. The Service Provider must then make a
back-channel request directly to the Identity Provider using the provided code,
and exchange it for an ID token.

OpenID Connect with keystone and horizon
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

.. seqdiag::
   :name: oidc-keystone-horizon
   :alt: Diagram of the OpenID Connect WebSSO auth flow specific to horizon,
         keystone, and the HTTPD module acting as service provider.

   seqdiag {
     edge_length = 200
     default_fontsize = 13;
     useragent [label = "User Agent"]; horizon [label = "Horizon"]; httpd [label = "HTTPD", color = "lightgrey"]; keystone [label = "Keystone", color = "lightgrey"]; idp [label = "Identity Provider"];
     useragent -> horizon [label = "POST /auth/login"];
     useragent <- horizon [label = "HTTP 302
                                    Location:
                                    /v3/auth/OS-FEDERATION
                                    /websso/saml2"];
     useragent -> httpd [label = "GET /v3/auth/OS-FEDERATION/websso/saml2"];
     useragent <- httpd [label = "HTTP 302
                                   Location:
                                   https://idp/auth?
                                   client_id=XXX&
                                   redirect_uri=https://sp/v3/auth/OS-FEDERATION/websso"];
     useragent -> idp [label = "GET /auth?client_id=XXX&
                                    redirect_uri=https://sp/v3/auth/OS-FEDERATION/websso"];
     idp -> idp [label = "Authenticate"];
     useragent <- idp [label = "HTTP 302
                                Location: https://sp/v3/auth/OS-FEDERATION/websso"];
     useragent -> httpd [label = "GET /v3/auth/OS-FEDERATION/websso"];
     httpd -> idp [label = "POST https://idp/token
                                 code=XXX&
                                 redirect_uri=https://sp/v3/auth/OS-FEDERATION/websso"];
     httpd <- idp [label = "HTTP 200
                           {\"access_code\": \"XXX\",
                            \"id_token\": \"XXX\"}"];
     useragent <- httpd [label = "HTTP 302
                                  Location: /v3/auth/OS-FEDERATION/websso/mapped"];
     useragent -> keystone [label = "GET /v3/auth/OS-FEDERATION/websso/mapped"];
     keystone -> keystone [label = "Issue token"];
     useragent <- keystone [label = "HTTP 200
                                     HTML form containing unscoped token"];
     useragent -> horizon [label = "POST /auth/websso"];
     useragent <- horizon [label = "successful login"];
   }

From horizon and keystone's point of view, the authentication flow is the same
for OpenID Connect as it is for SAML2.0. It is only the HTTPD OpenIDC module
that must handle the flow in accordance with the spec.
